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quash, in all but unusual cases.
Carl Lawrence

BusnEss CORPORATION LAW

BCL § 626: Corporatedissolution and distribution of assets held
not to preclude subsequent derivative action
Section 626 of the Business Corporation Law (BCL) authorizes shareholders to derivatively prosecute an action in the right
of a corporation.1 24 To be entitled to commence such an action, the
plaintiff-stockholder must be a "holder at the time of bringing the
action,112 5 as well as at the time of the alleged wrong. 126 While the
Section 626 of the Business Corporation Law (BCL) provides in pertinent part:
(a) An action may be brought in the right of a ... corporation to procure a judgment in itsfavor, by a holder of shares ... of the corporation or of a beneficial
interest in such shares ....
NY. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1963).
At common law, those entrusted with the management and direction of a corporation
could with impunity breach fiduciary duties owed to the corporation since shareholders were
not permitted to bring actions at law against corporate directors to account for their actions
or transgressions. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970). Hence, the shareholders' derivative action developed as an equitable remedy to protect shareholders against such
abuses on the part of management. Halpern v. Pennsylvania R.R., 189 F. Supp. 494, 498
(E.D.N.Y. 1960); Burnham v. Brush, 176 Misc. 39, 41, 26 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1941); see H. HENN, CORPORATIONS §§ 358-360 (2d ed. 1970); Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes On Its Derivation,32 N.Y.U.L. REV.980, 987-89 (1957). The
scope of this remedy was subsequently expanded to permit actions against third parties who
had injured the corporation, and against whom the corporation, through its directors' inaction, did not seek redress. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 345 (1856).
The derivative action, as embodied in section 626, is the shareholder's sole remedy for a
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to a corporation by a corporate director or officer. Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N.Y.S.2d 64, 71 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944). It is distinguishable from
both a representative action-an action in which the stockholder alleges that a duty owed to
a class of which he is a member has been breached by the corporation acting through its
directors (for example, the denial of voting rights), see Siegal v. Engelmann, 1 Misc. 2d 447,
143 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955); Lazar v. Knolls Co-op. Section No. 2, 205
Misc. 748, 130 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1954), and a personal action-an action
in which the shareholder alleges that a duty owed to him individually has been breached by
the corporation through its directors, see Diamond v. Davis, 60 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1945). See generally Note, DistinguishingBetween Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1962).
125 Hanna v. Lyon, 179 N.Y. 107, 110, 71 N.E. 778, 779
(1904); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
626(b) (McKinney 1963). The rationale underlying the requirement that the plaintiff be a
stockholder at the time of commencement is that the plaintiff, being under no fiduciary
duty to vindicate a wrong to a corporation, institutes the suit to have the corporation made
12,
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law is well settled that a shareholder loses the capacity to institute
or continue a derivative suit when, through voluntary sale or deprivation of title, his proprietary interest in the corporation ceases,127
the courts had not addressed whether a corporate dissolution and
the accompanying distribution of assets pursuant thereto deprives
a shareholder of the interest requisite to maintaining a derivative
suit.1 28 Recently, however, in Independent Investor Protective
League v. Time, Inc.,12 9 the Court of Appeals liberally construed
the rule requiring stock ownership at the commencement of a derivative action, allowing such an action subsequent to the corpora-

tion's dissolution and distribution of assets.13 0

In Independent Investor, shareholders and former shareholders of record of Sterling Communications, Inc. (Sterling) at the
whole not only for the benefit of the corporation, but also for the benefit of every stockholder, and is "authorized to proceed only because of his proprietary interest in the corporation." Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 211, 160 N.E.2d 463, 466, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158, 163
(1959). Therefore, one who voluntarily disposes of his ownership in a corporation may
neither commence nor proceed in a derivative action. See Harris v. Averick, 24 Misc. 2d
1039, 1040, 204 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960). Similarly, a party who is
deprived of legal title to his stock may not commence or proceed in an action unless he
retains an equitable interest therein. Witherbee v. Bowles, 142 App. Div. 407, 418, 126
N.Y.S. 954, 962-63 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 201 N.Y. 427, 95 N.E. 27 (1911).
126 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963); Myer v. Myer, 271 App. Div. 465,
474, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83, 91-92 (1st Dep't 1946), affl'd, 296 N.Y. 929, 73 N.E. 562 (1947) (upholding the constitutionality of the predecessor provision, General Corporation Law, ch. 650, §
61, [1969] N.Y. Laws 1521). The requirement that the plaintiff own stock at the time of the
commission of the wrong, was first imposed by the Supreme Court in Hawes v. Oakland, 104
U.S. 450, 461 (1881), to stop the practice of transferring stock to nonresidents after the
occurrence of the alleged wrong to create diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 453. The rule was
subsequently codified by the Court in Equity Rule 94. Sup. Ct. R. 94, 104 U.S. IX (1881)
(presently codified at FED.R. Civ. P. 23.1). State courts have since adopted this "contemporaneous ownership" requirement to prevent purchasers of stock from speculating in litigation. Note, The Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement in the Stockholder's Derivative
Suit, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 622, 624 (1977); see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 556 (1949). New York adopted this requirement in 1944. Ch. 667, § 1, [1944] N.Y. LAws
1454.
See note 125 supra.
217
128 See, e.g., Maid v. Estate of Ziehm, 55 App. Div. 2d 454, 456, 391 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707
(3d Dep't 1977); In re Baldwin Trading Corp., 2 Misc. 2d 698, 706, 151 N.Y.S.2d 964, 972
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 8 N.Y.2d 144, 202 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1960); Brennan v. Barnes, 133 Misc. 340, 344-45, 232 N.Y.S.2d 112, 119 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1928). In Baldwin Trading, the court posited that a plaintiff-shareholder could commence a derivative action notwithstanding the corporation's dissolution; however, the court
disposed of the case on other grounds prior to reaching this question. 2 Misc. 2d at 706, 151
N.Y.S.2d at 972.
129 50 N.Y.2d 259, 406 N.E.2d 486, 428 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1980), rev'g 66 App. Div. 2d 391,
412 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1979).
120 50 N.Y.2d at 261, 406 N.E.2d at 487-88, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
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time of its dissolution,"-" instituted a derivative action alleging that
Time, Inc. (Time), the majority shareholder of Sterling, and the
officers and directors of Sterling fraudulently mismanaged the corporation, thereby depressing the value of Sterling's stock and enabling Time to acquire Sterling at a price below its true market
value. 13 2 The action was commenced 6 months after the winding
up, pursuant to shareholder authorization, of Sterling's affairs.133
Time moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue. 3 4 Special term granted the motion, finding
that since the corporate entity no longer existed, the plaintiffs
could not satisfy the share ownership requirement of section
626(b) of the BCL and, therefore, could not proceed in a derivative
capacity.' 5 The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed. 136
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
maintenance of a derivative action was proper, notwithstanding
the prior dissolution of the corporation and accompanying distribution of assets. 13 7 Chief Judge Cooke, writing for a unanimous
Court, initially observed that although the common-law rule required the abatement of an action by or against a corporation upon
132The plaintiffs in this action may be classified into four groups: (1) those who accepted payment from the defendant, Time, Inc., and surrendered their shares in Sterling;
(2) those who demanded the fair market value of their shares under the appraisal provision
in section 623 of the BCL; (3) stockholders of record who refused a tendered payment for
their stock; and (4) stockholders who were not of record at the time of Sterling's dissolution.
66 App. Div. 2d at 392, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
132 Id.
133 50 N.Y.2d

at 262, 406 N.E.2d at 487, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 672. The stockholders' vote
authorizing the dissolution of Sterling occurred on September 7, 1973. Id. Time acquired
Sterling's assets by late September 1973. 66 App. Div. 2d at 392, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 899. The
action was commenced in March 1974.
50 N.Y.2d at 262, 406 N.E.2d at 487, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
135 Id.
136 66 App. Div. 2d at 396, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 901. Neither the decision of the appellate
division nor the decision of special term foreclosed the shareholders' right to pursue redress
in an individual or representative capacity against the individual defendants, the former
directors of Sterling. Id. at 395-96, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 901. The appellate division affirmed
special term's refusal to permit the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to assert either of
the alternative actions, however, on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to show that the
individual defendants were before the court, since they had not been served with process.
Id. at 395, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
137 50 N.Y.2d at 264, 406 N.E.2d at 489, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 674. Notably, the Court upheld the dismissal of those plaintiffs who had sought appraisal under section 623 of the BCL
on the ground that appraisal is an exclusive remedy. Id.; N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 623(c), (k)
(McKinney 1963).
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the corporation's dissolution, the legislature, in enacting section
1006(a)(4) of the BCL, specifically provided that a corporation was
to continue to exist as a legal entity for the purposes of judicial
proceedings even after dissolution."3 8 The Court noted that although section 626 of the BCL specifically requires a plaintiff to
establish ownership at the commencement of a derivative action,
this rule was not absolute. 139 Rather, the section 626(b) ownership
requirement was pragmatic in nature, reflecting the need to ensure

that the plaintiff is not a stranger to the corporation and is actually representative of the class of stockholders whose rights are
purportedly being protected.1 40 In the wake of dissolution, however, a "stockholder possesses a substantial interest in the distribution of corporate assets," according to the Court, and thus, re-

tains a significant interest in pursuing any existing cause of action
in favor of the corporation.1 41 This interest, the Court found, is
sufficient "to satisfy the spirit of the rule. 1' 42 Moreover, the Court
noted that section 1006(b) of the BCL which provides that the dissolution of a corporation does not affect any remedy available to or
against a corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders which
existed prior to the corporation's dissolution, buttressed its conclusion that such dissolution of itself cannot prevent a qualified plaintiff from satisfying the ownership requirements of section 626(b) of
3
14
the BCL.

It is suggested that while the Court's conclusion was sound, it
might have reached the desired result without sanctioning noncompliance with the literal requirement of section 626(b) ownership. Section 1006(b) contemplates the survival, inter alia, of corporate remedies during the winding up of corporate affairs.144 It is
1- 50 N.Y.2d at 263, 406 N.E.2d at 488, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 672. Section 1006(a)(4) of the
BCL provides that a dissolved corporation, in winding up its affairs, may "sue or be sued in
all courts and participate in actions and proceedings." N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1006(a)(4)
(McKinney 1963). The Court noted that earlier, under the predecessor statute, section 29 of
the General Corporation Law, ch. 650, § 29, [1929] N.Y. Laws 1531, it had held that a dissolved corporation could be a party to litigation even after distribution of assets. 50 N.Y.2d
at 263, 406 N.E.2d at 488, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 672 (citing Matter of Ehrlich, Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 275,
279, 157 N.E.2d 495, 501, 184 N.Y.S.2d 334, 338 (1959)).
19 50 N.Y.2d at 263, 406 N.E.2d at 488, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
140Id. at 263-64, 406 N.E.2d at 488, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
141 Id. at 264, 406 N.E.2d at 488, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
142Id.
141Id. at 264, 406 N.E.2d at 488-89, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 673-74 (citing N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAw § 1006(b) (McKinney 1963)).
14 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1006(b) (McKinney 1963). Section 1006(b) was based on
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submitted that in Independent Investor the cause of action to recover for the directors' mismanagement of the corporation is an
unliquidated asset, 5 precluding, at least pro tanto, the completion
of corporate winding up.1 46 Thus, the institution of a derivative ac-

tion, the proper remedy for injuries to the corporation even during
section 98 (now section 105) of the Model Business Corporations Act. JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAWS, REVISERS NOTES AND COMMENTS TO
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 65 (Revised Supplement to Fifth Interim Report to 1961 Ses-

sion of New York State Legislature) (Legislative Document (1961) No. 12). Section 105 of
the Model Business Corporations Act was drafted in order to avoid the common-law rule
that dissolution of a corporation terminated its legal existence and abated pending legal
proceedings. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 105, 2 (2d ed. 1971).
'" A cause of action against corporate directors for the mismanagement of corporate
assets is redressable only by the corporation and not by its shareholders in an individual or
representative capacity, and any recovery obtained by the shareholders suing derivatively
inures to the corporation. Klum v. Clinton Trust Co., 183 Misc. 340, 48 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1944); see Smith v. Bradlee, 37 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942).
See generally note 154 and accompanying text infra; see also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623
(McKinney 1963). Section 623 provides for an appraisal remedy to determine the fair market value of the shares held by shareholders dissenting from a corporation's dissolution. Id.
Pursuant to the determination of the stock's value the appraiser may consider, as an unliquidated asset, any corporate causes of action. Id.
1"I A corporation's affairs have been "wound up," when all liabilities have been satisfied
and discharged and all assets have been realized and distributed. See Fleckner v. Bank of
the United States, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338, 362 (1823); United States v. Metcalf, 131 F.2d
677, 679 (9th Cir. 1942). In Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 480 (1855), the United
States Supreme Court, in considering whether a corporation's existence had terminated,
held that where assets remain in the corporate entity for distribution, the corporation retains substance and therefore, cannot be considered to have ceased to exist. Id. at 488-89.
Parenthetically, the Bacon Court further noted that where assets remain unliquidated, the
corporation's shareholders could maintain a derivative action to force the distribution of
these remaining assets. Id. at 489. In Independent Investor, since the corporation retained
an unliquidated asset subsequent to the directors' disbursement of assets, it cannot be said
to have had its affairs completely wound up.
Additionally, it is suggested that, in determining whether Sterling had been wound up,
consideration must be given to the pendency of appraisal proceedings pursuant to section
623 of the BCL. Since an appraisal judgment is satisfied through the corporation by a disbursement of corporate assets, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1963), the pendency
of these proceedings involving claims against this corporation, it is submitted, indicates that
the corporation has not been wound up. Moreover, if assets have been set aside to satisfy a
judgment arising from appraisal proceedings and the amount set aside exceeds the amount
which must be disbursed, the corporation retains assets for distribution, and cannot be considered to have been terminated by liquidation. See Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
at 488-89. In the alternative, if insufficient assets or no assets have been set aside, it is
submitted that winding up has not been completed as corporate liabilities have not been
provided for, as required by the BCL. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1005(a)(3) (McKinney
1963). In this event, the BCL provides that the directors are jointly and severally liable to
the corporation, id. § 719(a)(3), and authorizes a suit against the corporation by the creditors or a derivative suit by the shareholders against the directors for failing to provide for
the corporation's liabilities, id. § 1006(a)(4).
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the winding up period, would be timely.
It is submitted, moreover, that shareholders of record at the
time of dissolution satisfy the section 626(b) ownership requirement and thus have standing to proceed pursuant to section 626.147
During the pendency of the period preceding winding up, such
shareholders are considered the equitable owners of the corporation."" It is suggested that this equitable ownership concept is
analogous to the statutory ownership requirement of a "beneficial
interest" in the corporation's stock at the time a derivative action
is commenced. 14 Indeed, it is at least arguable that the legislature
has borrowed from equity the standards by which to determine
standing in a derivative action. 15 0 Since these standards require
only that the plaintiff-shareholder in a derivative action demonstrate an interest in the corporation, 1 51 the shareholder's "substantial interest in the distribution of corporate assets'1 52 would, it is
submitted, satisfy the legislative "ownership" mandate incorpo153
rated in section 626(b) of the BCL.
147 It is suggested that if, after dissolution, an asset, such as an unliquidated cause of
action, remains, then a vestige of shareholder status remains sufficient to satisfy the section
626(b) ownership requirement. See note 148, infra. Indeed, in such a situation the requirement should be held satisfied since the shareholder has not divested himself of his ownership, but rather merely has had his ownership interest diminished to the extent that assets
have been distributed.
141Weinert v. Kinkel, 296 N.Y. 151, 153, 71 N.E.2d 445, 446 (1947) (per curiam); see 2
HORNSTEIN'S CORPORAION LAW AND PRACTIcE §§ 711, 714-718 (1959). Since equity recognizes that the shareholders are, in essence, the proprietors of a corporation and are ultimately the sole beneficiaries thereof, Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185,
195, 123 N.E. 148, 151 (1919), it follows then, that at distribution the shareholders remain
the equitable owners of those assets not distributed.
10 Section 626 of the BCL provides that a derivative action may be commenced by one
who is a "holder of shares. . . or of a beneficial interest [therein]"at the time of initiating
suit. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(a), (b) (McKinney 1963) (emphasis added). Since the legislature contemplates that a "beneficial interest" is a sufficient predicate to commence suit, it
appears reasonable that a holder of an "equitable ownership" interest would be an appropriate plaintiff. Such equitable ownership has been held to be vested in the shareholders who
hold shares at the time of dissolution and distribution of assets. See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
11OSee notes 124 & 126 supra; cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626(c) (McKinney 1963)
(originally a procedural rule of the courts, Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 19,
99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912)). See also note 151 infra.
1 As a corollary of the equitable nature of the derivative action, see note 124 supra,
the standing requirement, likewise developed, as an equitable matter, Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1881); see Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970), and has always
necessitated a demonstration of a shareholder's proprietary interest. See note 125 supra.
152 50 N.Y.2d at 264, 406 N.E.2d at 488, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
'11 Since it is well settled that equity looks to substance, and not form, Small v. Sullivan, 245 N.Y. 343, 354, 157 N.E. 261, 264 (1927); Marco v. Sachs, 201 Misc. 933, 937 (Sup.
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The courts of New York have long held that corporate mismanagement constitutes a corporate injury redressable only by a
derivative action.'" A strict construction of section 626(b) precluding a derivative action after dissolution would dispense with the
equitable purpose of the derivative action-to provide relief to
shareholders from the abuses of corporate directors which are otherwise not redressable. 155 Thus, it is submitted that the IndepenCt. Kings County 1951), it is submitted that the interest retained upon dissolution, see note
148 supra, should suffice to permit the commencement of a derivative action notwithstanding the corporation's dissolution. See also note 147 supra.
' Greenfield v. Denner, 6 N.Y.2d 867, 868, 160 N.E.2d 118, 118, 188 N.Y.S.2d 986, 987
(1959), rev'g, 6 App. Div. 2d 263, 175 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't 1958); Maki v. Estate of
Ziehm, 55 App. Div. 2d 454, 457, 391 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (3d Dep't 1977); Berzin v. Litton
Indus., Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 740, 740,7263 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (1st Dep't 1965) (per curiam);
Brennan v. Barnes, 133 Misc. 340, 344-45, 232 N.Y.S.2d 112, 119 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1928); cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 720 (McKinney 1963) (injury caused by director's mismanagement of corporate assets may be redressed by shareholders only by means of BCL section 626). While the cases cited above deal with mismanagement by corporate directors, it
should be noted that the rule is the same if a majority shareholder causes corporate assets
to be mismanaged-a cause of action arising from such mismanagement belongs to the corporation and not to the minority shareholders in their own right. Beloff v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 274 App. Div. 980, 85
N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st Dep't 1948) (mem.), af'd, 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E. 687 (1949); Amella v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), af'd, 273 App. Div.
755, 75 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1st Dep't 1947).
In order to be permitted to bring an individual or representative action, the shareholder
must show an injury peculiar to his status as a stockholder founded upon the breach of a
duty separate and apart from that owed to the corporate entity. See Parascandola v. National Sur. Co., 249 N.Y. 335, 342, 164 N.E. 242, 243 (1928); General Rubber Co. v. Benedict,
215 N.Y. 18, 22, 109 N.E. 96, 97 (1915); Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 44, 265 N.Y.S.
172, 179 (2d Dep't 1933); Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 268-69, 110 N.Y.S.
629, 635 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 196 N.Y. 510, 89 N.E. 1114 (1909); Coronado Dev. Corp. v. Millikin, 175 Misc. 1, 4, 22 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940). It is possible, however, for a derivative action and an individual action to co-exist upon a director's misdeeds.
For example, a director may, in addition to the relationship of stockholder-director, engage
in some other personal fiduciary relationship with the shareholder, see A. STEvENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATxONS 790 (2d ed. 1949); cf. Ritchie v. McMullen, 79
F. 522 (6th Cir. 1897) (pledgor-pledgee), and the breach of one would constitute a breach of
the other. See A. STEVENS, supra, at 790.
There are several reasons why suits to recover upon a corporate right of action cannot
be maintained by a shareholder in his individual capacity, the most important being the
necessity of affording protection to the rights of corporate creditors. See A. STEVENS, supra,
at 787-92; cf. Maki v. Estate of Ziehm, 55 App. Div. 2d 454, 457, 391 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (3d
Dep't 1977) (since corporate liabilities must be satisfied prior to distribution of any assets,
derivative action must be considered appropriate remedy to redress corporate injuries upon
dissolution).
115 If no fiduciary duty is owed directly to the shareholder from the director, a duty
being owed only to the corporation, the denial of standing to the shareholder in a derivative
capacity would leave the shareholder remediless since there would be no predicate for an
individual or representative action. See note 154 and accompanying text supra. Notably,
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dent Investor Court's conclusion that dissolution should not preclude the institution and prosecution of a derivative suit is
consistent with the literal requirements of section 626(b) and, indeed, is necessary in order to provide a remedy for minority shareholders aggrieved by the misconduct of those persons exercising
corporate control.
John F. Finnegan

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW

General admonition to jointly represented defendants sufficient
to discharge trial court's duty of inquiry
Joint representation of criminal defendants is highly suspect
because the frequent inability of one attorney to protect the conflicting interests of codefendants156 is likely to give rise to the ineffective assistance of counsel. 157 Although the sixth amendment
however, the appellate division intimated that a direct fiduciary duty was owing to the
stockholder from the corporate directors, and, therefore, the shareholder had recourse to a
remedy, either a representative or an individual action. 66 App. Div. 2d at 393, 412 N.Y.S.2d
at 899. The court, however, did not detail the nature of this fidiciary duty. Id. at 393, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 901. But see note 154 supra.
To hold that a corporate dissolution would have the effect of vitiating a shareholder's
derivative action, thereby leaving the shareholder remediless, see note 154 supra, could induce dishonest corporate directors to arrange for a dissolution and distribution of assets,
thereby preventing action against themselves. Holmes v. Camp, 186 App. Div. 675, 679, 175
N.Y.S. 349, 352 (1st Dep't), a/I'd, 227 N.Y. 635, 126 N.E. 910 (1919). See generally note 124
supra.
1'
For a discussion of the types of conflict involved in joint representation of multiple
defendants, see Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the ProfessionalResponsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119,
125-35 (1978); Girgenti, Problems of Joint Representation of Defendants in a Criminal
Case, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 55, 61-67 (1979); Judd, Conflicts of Interest-A Trial Judge's
Notes, 44 FORDHAM L. Rlv. 1097, 1099-1107 (1976); Lowenthal, Joint Representation in
Criminal Cases:A CriticalAppraisal,64 VA. L. REv. 939, 941-50 (1978). Typically, claims of
conflict allege either counsel's failure to act in favor of one defendant in fear of implicating
the other, see, e.g., People v. Coleman, 42 N.Y.2d 500, 369 N.E.2d 742, 399 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1977), or taking of affirmative steps by counsel which inure to the benefit of one client
while severely damaging the case of the other. See People v. Dell, 60 App. Div. 2d 18, 400
N.Y.S.2d 236 (4th Dep't 1977). Additionally, many defenses at trial may be lost due to counsel's attempt to minimize the existence of conflict. See Geer, supra, at 125-28.
157 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978); People v. Gomberg, 38
N.Y.2d 307, 312, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (1975); Geer, supra note 156, at
121; Lowenthal, supra note 156, at 939.
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed to criminal defendants.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; CPL § 210.15(2) (1971). While it is the duty

